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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM D. BLODGETT and 
FLORENCE G. BLODGETT, his 
wife, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
JOE MARTSCH, BETTY PURCELL, 
aka BETTY PURCELL MARTSCH, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Case No. 860544 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT BETTY PURCELL 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issues presented on appeal relate to the ability of 
the plaintiffs to amend a final order of the Third Judicial 
District Court entered approximately six years earlier. 
ISSUE NO. 1 
May a party file a motion to amend a final order of the 
district court without first notifying the other party to 
appoint counsel when counsel for the moving party is aware that 
the other party is not currently represented by counsel? 
ISSUE NO. 2 
May a party file a motion to amend a final order of the 
district court entered approximately six years earlier pursuant 
to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? 
ISSUE NO. 3 
Is the Amended Order and Judgment of Quiet Title entered 
August 13, 1986 void because it purports to set aside the Order 
signed May 5, 1980 and to relate back and be effective as of 
May 5, 1980 in contravention of Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure? 
ISSUE NO. 4 
Was the alleged error in the judgment entered May 5, 1980 
a clerical error that could be corrected by motion pursuant to 
Rule 60(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For simplicity, references to pages in the record of 
Civil No. 223407 will be preceded by "Rj" and references to 
pages in the record of Civil No. C-78-8017 will be preceded by 
"RH". 
1. In 1971 plaintiffs-respondents and defendant-
appellant entered into a transaction pursuant to which 
defendant-appellant and others acquired an interest in certain 
real property located in Salt Lake County, Utah (Rj 3). 
2. In 1974 plaintiffs-respondents commenced a case 
against defendant-appellant and others (Civil No. 223407), 
seeking in their Amended Complaint a judgment against 
defendants in the sum of $260,000 or reconveyance of the 
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subject real property, (Rj 221). In 1978 plaintiffs-
respondents commenced a separate action against defendant-
appellant and others (Civil No. C-78-8017) seeking a judgment 
requiring the defendants to convey the subject real property to 
plaintiffs or a judgment awarding plaintiffs the value of the 
property. (Rn 96). The trial court subsequently consolidated 
these actions. (Rj 555). 
3. On or about March 20, 1980, plaintiffs and defendants 
executed a written stipulation regarding settlement and 
dismissal of the legal actions in the consolidated cases. Such 
Stipulation of Dismissal was prepared by counsel for 
plaintiffs. (Rj 991). A copy of such Stipulation of Dismissal 
is attached hereto. 
4. On or about May 5, 1980, Judge Ernest F. Baldwin, 
signed an Order dismissing the cases with prejudice. Such 
Order was prepared by counsel for plaintiffs. (Rj 990). A 
copy of such Order is attached hereto. 
5. In addition to the payments defendant-appellant had 
made to plaintiffs-respondents, plaintiffs-respondents received 
back the subject property with extensive improvements 
defendant-appellant had made on the property, which 
improvements had cost defendant-appellant in excess of 
$50,000. (Rj 1109-1111). 
6. On or about March 28, 1986 plaintiffs filed a Motion 
to Set Aside Order of Dismissal and Enter Judgment of Quiet 
Title. (Rx 1009). 
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7. On or about March 28, 1986 plaintiffs filed an 
Affidavit of Lester A. Perry in which Mr. Perry stated that Mr. 
Ronald A. Barker "indicated that he no longer represented Ms. 
Purcell and wants nothing to do with her." (Rj 1010). 
8. Without giving defendant Pursell written notice to 
appoint another attorney or to appear in person, plaintiffs 
proceeded with their Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal and 
Enter Judgment of Quiet Title. (Rj 1110). 
9. In plaintiffs1 Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
in Support of Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal and Enter 
Judgment of Quiet Title, plaintiffs state in the first sentence 
of their argument: 
Rule 60(b) allows the court to set aside an order or 
judgment for any reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the order or judgment. (Rj 1017). 
10. Plaintiffs submitted to the Court an Order and 
Judgment of Quiet Title, which was executed by the Court and 
entered on May 13, 1986. (Rj 1037-1039). A copy of such Order 
and Judgment of Quiet Title is attached hereto. 
11. Plaintiffs subsequently submitted to the Court an 
Order and Judgment of Quiet Title, which was executed by the 
Court and entered on August 13, 1986 with the handwritten 
notation "Amended." (Rj 1040-1042). A copy of such Amended 
Order and Judgment of Quiet Title is attached hereto. 
12. On September 11, 1986 defendant Pursell filed a 
Motion to Set Aside Amended Order and Judgment of Quiet Title 
on the following grounds: 
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a. That plaintiffs failed to give defendant written 
notice to appoint counsel or appear in person as required 
by Utah Code Ann. Section 78-51-36 (1953). 
b. That without notice to defendants plaintiff 
sought an Amended Order and Judgment of Quiet Title 
executed by the Court on August 13, 1986. 
c. That a motion for relief of a final judgment or 
order pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure must be made "within a reasonable time," and 
for certain reasons must be made within 3 months after 
the order or judgment was taken. 
d. That the Amended Order and Judgment of Quiet 
Title entered August 13, 1986 is void because it purports 
to set aside the Order signed May 5, 1980 and to relate 
back and be effective as of May 5, 1980 in contravention 
of Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (Rj 
1055-1057). 
13. On September 11, 1986 defendant Purse!i fxied an Ex 
Parte Motion to extend time to file Notice of Appeal. On the 
same date the Court entered its order extending time to file a 
Notice of Appeal to October 12, 1986, which date was 30 days 
after the prescribed time for filing a Notice of Appeal with 
respect to the Amended Order and Judgment entered August 13, 
1986. (Rj 1048-1049) . 
14. On or about September 15, 1986 plaintiffs filed a 
Motion to Correct Clerical Error under Rule 60(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure and a Motion to Set Aside Order 
Extending Time to File Notice of Appeal. (Rj 1043-1044). 
15. Without ruling on Defendant's Motion to Set Aside 
the Amended Order and Judgment of Quiet Title, Judge David B. 
Dee signed a third Order and Judgment of Quiet Title, which was 
entered September 26, 1986. (Rj 1091-1093). A copy of such 
Order and Judgment of Quiet Title is attached hereto. 
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16. Because the District Court had not ruled on 
defendant Pursell!s motion to set aside the Amended Order and 
Judgment of Quiet Title entered August 13, 1986, defendant 
Pursell filed a Notice of Appeal on October 9, 1986 with 
respect to both the Amended Order and Judgment of Quiet Title 
entered August 13, 1986 and the Order and Judgment of Quiet 
Title entered September 26, 1986. (Rj 1097-1101). 
17. On January 26, 1987, Judge David B. Dee entered an 
order denying the motion of defendant Pursell to set aside the 
Amended Order and Judgment of Quiet Title entered August 13, 
1986 and denying the motion of plaintiffs to set aside the 
Order Extending Time to File Notice of Appeal. (RI 
1117-1118). A copy of such Order is attached hereto. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs could not amend the Order entered by Judge 
Baldwin on May 5, 1980 for the following reasons: 
(a) Plaintiffs failed to require defendant Pursell 
to appoint new counsel or appear in person before 
plaintiffs proceeded with their motion to set aside the 
order and enter judgment of quiet title in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-51-36 (1953). 
(b) Plaintiffs were not entitled to amend the order 
dated May 5, 1980 pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure because that rule requires that 
a motion for relief must be made within a reasonable 
time, and for certain reasons must be made within 3 
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months after the order or judgment was taken. 
(c) The Amended Order and Judgment of Quiet Title 
entered August 13, 1986 is void because it purports to 
set aside the Order signed May 5f 1980 and to relate back 
and be effective as of May 5, 1980 in contravention of 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(d) The alleged error of failing to include 
reference to quiet title in the Order signed May 5, 1980 
was not a clerical error subject to correction by motion 
pursuant to Rule 60(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO REQUIRE DEFENDANT PURSELL TO APPOINT 
NEW COUNSEL OR APPEAR IN PERSON BEFORE PLAINTIFFS PROCEEDED 
WITH THEIR MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER AND ENTER JUDGMENT OF 
QUIET TITLE IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. SECTION 78-51-36 
(1953). 
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-51-36 (1953) provides: 
When an attorney dies or is removed or suspended, or 
ceases to act as such, a party to an action or proceeding 
for whom he was acting as attorney must before any 
further proceedings are had against him be required by 
the adverse party, by written notice, to appoint another 
attorney or to appear in person. 
According to the Affidavit of Lester A. Perry dated March 
17, 1986 and filed with the District Court as Exhibit "A" to 
plaintiffs' Motion to Set Aside Order and Enter Judgment of 
Quiet Title, 
On March 10, 1986, I spoke with Mr. Ronald C. Barker, the 
attorney of record for Ms. Purcell during the latter part 
of the litigation within the case at bar. Mr. Barker 
indicated that he no longer represented Ms. Purcell and 
wants nothing to do with her. . . . 
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Because plaintiffs1 counsel was aware that the attorney of 
record had ceased to act as defendant Pursell's attorney, 
counsel was required to notify defendant Pursell to appoint new 
counsel or appear in person before proceeding with the Motion 
to Set Aside Order and Enter Judgment of Quiet Title. 
Accordingly, any actions by plaintiffs until counsel for 
defendant Pursell entered his appearance should be void. 
II. PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO AMEND THE ORDER DATED MAY 
5, 1980 PURSUANT TO RULE 60(b) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE BECAUSE THAT RULE REQUIRES THAT A MOTION FOR RELIEF 
MUST BE MADE WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME, AND FOR CERTAIN REASONS 
MUST BE MADE WITHIN 3 MONTHS AFTER THE ORDER OR JUDGMENT WAS 
TAKEN. 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, 
in part: 
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; 
Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud, Etc. On motion and 
upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal 
representative from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding for the following reasons (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly 
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have 
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under 
Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated 
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other 
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for any cause, 
the summons in an action has not been personally served 
upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the 
defendant has failed to appear in said action; (5) the 
judgment is void; (6) the judgment has been satisfied, 
released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which 
it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it 
is no longer equitable that the judgment should have 
prospective application; or (7) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. 
The motion shall be made within a reasonble time and for 
reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 months 
after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or 
taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) does not 
affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its 
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operation. . . . 
Plaintiffs1 Motion to Set Aside Order and Enter Judgment of 
Quiet Title was made pursuant to Rule 60(b), although 
plaintiffs did not specify the exact reason for which they were 
entitled to relief. In their Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in support of Motion to Set Aside Order of 
Dismissal and Enter Judgment of Quiet Title, plaintiffs argued: 
Rule 60(b) allows the court to set aside an order or 
judgment for any reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the order or judgment. (Rj 1017). 
The only possible basis for setting aside the Order dated May 
5, 1980 was that counsel for plaintiffs had not included a 
provision regarding quieting title in the Order that counsel 
for plaintiffs had prepared and submitted to the court. A 
motion to set aside an order due to mistake or inadvertance 
must be made within 3 months after entry of the judgment or 
order. If relief is granted under a provision of Rule 60(b) 
other than items (1), (2), (3), and (4), the motion must be 
made within a reasonable time after entry of the judgment or 
order. Plaintiffs did not allege and the trial court did not 
find that plaintiffs' motion, which was made nearly six years 
after the court signed the Order date May 5, 1980, was made 
within a reasonable time nor did the court enter any findings 
as to a reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
Order dated May 5, 1980. 
III. THE AMENDED ORDER AND JUDGMENT OF QUIET TITLE ENTERED 
AUGUST 13, 1986 IS VOID BECAUSE IT PURPORTS TO SET ASIDE THE 
ORDER SIGNED MAY 5, 1980 AND TO RELATE BACK AND BE EFFECTIVE AS 
OF MAY 5, 1980 IN CONTRAVENTION OF RULE 60(b) OF THE UTAH RULES 
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
_ 9 . 
The Amended Order and Judgment of Quiet Title dated 
August 13, 1986 differed from the Order and Judgment of Quiet 
Title dated May 13, 1986 in several respects. The August 13, 
1986 Order contained the following provision, not found in the 
earlier Order: 
3. This Order shall relate back to and be effective 
as of May 5, 1980. 
The Amended Order and Judgment of Quiet Title entered 
August 13, 1986 was based upon plaintiffs1 Motion to Amend 
pursuant to Rule 60(b). Rule 60(b), however, provides, in part: 
. . . A motion under this subdivision (b) does not 
affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its 
operation. . . . 
The Amended Order and Judgment of Quiet Title could not relate 
back and be effective as of May 5, 1980 because that would 
affect the finality of the earlier judgment and suspend its 
operation. Accordingly, paragraph 3 of the Amended Order and 
Judgment of Quiet Title is void. 
IV. THE ALLEGED ERROR OF FAILING TO INCLUDE REFERENCE TO QUIET 
TITLE IN THE ORDER SIGNED MAY 5, 1980 WAS NOT A CLERICAL ERROR 
SUBJECT TO CORRECTION BY MOTION PURSUANT TO RULE 60(a) OF THE 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in reviewing cases involving 
alleged errors in judgments, has distinguished between clerical 
errors and judicial errors. In Richards v. Siddoway, 471 P.2d 
143 (Utah 1970), the defendant sought, ten years after judgment 
was entered in another case, to correct an alleged clerical 
error by an order in the case at bar. The Court, citing 46 Am. 
Jr. 2d Judgments §202, stated at page 145: 
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The distinction between a judicial error and a 
clerical error does not depend upon who made it. Rather, 
it depends on whether it was made in rendering the 
judgment or in recording the judgment as rendered. 
The Court concluded that the trial court in the earlier case 
may have erred in giving the plaintiff the remainder of the 
land in question but that there was no clerical error 
involved. The error resulted from the failure of the judge to 
follow the written agreement signed by the parties. The Court 
pointed out that only the plaintiff and her father knew whether 
the decree entered by the court was according to their wishes 
and intentions. Neither of the parties appealed, and the 
judgment became final nine years before an answer was filed in 
the case at bar. The Court stated: 
The record does not show that the judgment did not follow 
the findings of fact. Such an error must be corrected by 
a timely motion for a new trial, by timely appealing the 
matter, or by an independent action wherein all of the 
parties to the original proceeding are made parties to a 
new suit in equity. 
In the instant case, plaintiffs1 counsel prepared the 
Stipulation executed by the parties and the Order executed and 
entered by the court. The record does not show that the Order 
did not follow the Stipulation prepared by the parties. The 
error that plaintiffs allege occurred was not an error in 
recording the judgment but was an error in rendering the 
judgment (i.e., in preparing the Order that was signed by the 
court). Accordingly, under the reasoning of the Utah Supreme 
Court in Richards v. Siddoway, plaintiffs cannot correct the 
alleged error by a motion under Rule 60(a). 
Plaintiffs-respondents also cited Stanger v. Sentinel 
Sec. Life Ins. Co., 669 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983) in support of 
-11 -
their argument that the alleged error was a clerical error that 
can be corrected upon motion under Rule 60(a). The error in 
that case involved the calculation of the amount of the 
judgment. The Supreme Court, citing a federal district court, 
stated at page 1206: 
"It is the type of mistake or omission mechanical in 
nature which is apparent on the record and which does not 
involve a legal decision or judgment by an attorney." 
[Citation omitted.] 
In the instant case there is no mistake apparent on the 
record. The Order entered by the court follows in every regard 
the written Stipulation prepared by plaintiffs1 counsel and 
executed by the parties. Moreover, the alleged error was not a 
mechanical error involving the computation of a dollar amount, 
as was the situation in Stanger. 
In Lindsay v. Atkin, 680 P.2d 401 (Utah 1984), the trial 
court signed an order submitted by counsel for a third party 
defendant dismissing the case with prejudice. After judgment 
was entered against the defendants, the defendants, having 
satisfied the judgment, instituted an action against the former 
third party defendant, apparently for indemnification or 
contribution. The former third party defendant raised the 
dismissal with prejudice as a bar to to the action, and the 
defendants thereafter returned to the original trial court and 
moved, under Rule 60(a), to correct the dismissal with 
prejudice to one without prejudice. Again this Court cited Am. 
Jur. 2d to differentiate between a judicial error and a 
clerical error. The Court stated at page 402, 
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Rule 60(a) is not intended to correct errors of a 
substantial nature, particularly where the claim of error 
is unilateral. The fact that an intention was 
subsequently found to be mistaken would not cause the 
mistake to be "clerical." [Citations omitted.] 
The Court then concluded: 
In the instant case, the error complained of may not 
be characterized as "clerical." The court may have erred 
in granting Parrish Oil Tools a dismissal with prejudice, 
but the appropriate remedy was a timely motion to amend 
and/or a timely appeal to this Court. 
In the instant case, the error complained of (i.e., that the 
Order should have been a judgment that quieted title in 
plaintiffs) is very similar to the error complained of in 
Lindsay, where Order of Dismissal was with prejudice. The 
alleged error is not clerical. 
Finally, plaintiffs argue that the court ordered "quiet 
title" but that the subsequent written judgment omitted those 
words. The minute entry in the case states: 
The within case settled as set out in the Record. (Rj 
979). 
The transcript of the conference before the judge, which was 
attached to plaintiffs1 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal and Enter 
Judgment of Quiet Title, does not reflect any order of "quiet 
title" by the judge. The only reference in the record to quiet 
title is an uncompleted sentence by defendant's counsel. The 
settlement between the parties was described by defendant's 
counsel as follows: 
In the two consolidated cases our stipulation is we 
dismiss all of our claims and counterclaims and rights of 
appeal and quit-claim any right, title or interest in and 
to the real property involved in exchange for a complete 
and total release by Blodgetts in both cases as to their 
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claims and as to their judgment. 
That characterization of the settlement was not disputed by 
plaintiffs1 counsel, and the rest of the hearing was spent 
dealing with the mechanics of implementing the stipulation. 
Contrary to the allegation of plaintiffs1 counsel, there was no 
order of quiet-title. 
Moreover, on or about January 18, 1980 plaintiffs filed a 
Motion for Judgment Against Defendant Betty Purcell, in which 
plaintiffs sought a judgment ordering the transfer of any and 
all interest of Betty Purcell and Raco Car Wash Systems in and 
to the property to the plaintiffs, the release to plaintiffs of 
the sum of $2,450 on file with the Clerk's Office and finding 
defendant in contempt of court for failing to execute the 
quit-claim deed. Defendant Betty Purcell had refused to 
execute the Quit Claim deed on the ground that she did not have 
any interest in the property. Plaintiffs argued that counsel 
for defendant Betty Purcell had: 
stipulated in open court than [sic] in exchange for a 
release of any claims by plaintiffs against said 
defendant, said defendant on behalf of herself and her 
corporations would execute a quit claim deed in favor of 
the plaintiffs to all of the property in question. (Rj 
982). 
In plaintiffs' Motion there was no reference to an order for 
quiet title. 
Even if there had been a more definitive reference to 
quiet title by the parties in the conference with Judge 
Baldwin, the subsequent Stipulation signed by the parties 
superceded any prior discussion concerning quiet title. The 
-14 -
Order signed by the trial court clearly places the instant in 
the same category as the Lindsay case. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs-respondents filed several motions with the 
trial court in an attempt to correct an alleged error in the 
Order entered May 5, 1980. If the alleged error was an error 
identified in Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
plaintiffs-appellants failed to identify the nature of the 
error or to show that their motion to set aside that order was 
filed within a reasonable time after the Order was entered. 
Accordingly, the Amended Order and Judgment of Quiet Title 
entered by the trial court on August 13, 1986 was errorneous. 
The alleged error was a not a clerical error under the 
prior rulings of this Court. Therefore, the Order and Judgment 
of Quiet Title entered by the Court on September 26, 1986 was 
in error. 
Defendant-appellant requests the Supreme Court to reverse 
the Amended Order and Judgment of Quiet Title entered by the 
trial court on August 13, 1986 and the Order and Judgment of 
Quiet Title entered by the trial court on September 26, 1986. 
Dated this day of June, 1987. 
Respectfully submitted, 
James A. Arrowsmith 
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JOSEPH C. RUST 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
330 South Third East 
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Telephone: (801) 521-3680 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM p. BLODGETT and 
FLORENCE G. BLODGETT,his 
wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOE MARTSCH, BETTY PURCELL, 
aka BETTY PURCELL MARTSCH, 
et al., 
Defendants. 
STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL 
Civil No. 223407 and 
C-78-8017 
(Consolidated) 
ITON ft McCONKIE 
'TORNEYS AT LAW 
30 S THIRD EAST 
T LAKE CITY UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * 
Plaintiffs and defendants Betty Purcell Martsch, Raco Car 
Wash Systems, Inc. and Water Park Corporation stipulate and 
agree as follows: 
1. To the extent that judgment has not heretofore been 
entered, the Complaint of plaintiffs against the said defendants 
and specifically any claim of plaintiffs against defendant 
Betty Purcell Martsch with regard to the property in question 
are to be dismissed with prejudice. 
2. Any and all counterclaims by the defendants are to 
be dismissed with prejudice. 
3. The judgments heretofore entered against defendants 
Raco Car Wash Systems, Inc. and Water Park Corporation are deeme 
paid and satisfied. 
4. Any monies on deposit, specifically including the sum of 
$2,450 heretofore deposited by Michael Roll dba Aaron's Cotton-
wood Mowers as property rentals, are to be paid to plaintiffs. 
5. Judgments heretofore entered against any of the said 
defendants by the court will not be appealed to the Supreme Cour 
oo' ,o# 
TOM ft McCONKIE 
TORNEYS AT uAW 
io S THIRD EAST 
*» LAKF CITY UTAH 
of the State of Utah. 
6. Each party is to bear its own cojts. 
Dated this 20 day of March, 1980. 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
v/RONALD C. BARKER 
Y-oi-^A Ifrfc./^ 
Attorney for Betty Purcell 
0 o o ^ ' 
FILM m 
JOSEPH C. RUST 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
3 30 south Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3680 
tet^L^ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
WILLIAM j&. BLODGETT and 
FLORENCE G. BLODGETT, his 
wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOE MARTSCH, BETTY PURCELL, 
aka BETTY PURCELL MARTSCH, 
et al., 
Defendants. 
O R D E R 
Civil No. 223407 and 
C-78-8017 
(Consolidated) 
TON * McCONKIE 
TORNEYS AT LAW 
><) S THIRD EAST 
T LAKE CITY. UTAH 
Upon the Stipulation of counsel and for good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that to the 
extent judgment has not heretofore been entered, the Complaint 
of plaintiffs against defendants Betty Purcell Martsch, Raco 
Car Wash Systems, Inc., and Water Park Corporation is hereby 
dismissed with prejudice and any and all counterclaims of said 
defendants are hereby dismissed with prejudice, and each party 
to bear its own costs. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the sum of $2,450 on deposit 
with the court in this case be paid over to plaintiffs by the 
clerk of the court. 
Dated this _[ day of 1930. 
ERNEST F. BALDWIN, JUDGE 
McConkto 
j f t lmt l l 
>nal Corporation 
300 EAST 
AKt DTV 
^64111 
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Lester A. Perry - A2571 
Robert M. Dyer - A0495 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3680 s u n - fS^Q^ . 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM D. BLODGETT and 
FLORENCE G. BLODGETT, his wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs, 
JOE MARTSCH, BETTY PURCELL, 
aka BETTY PURCELL MARTSCH, 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND JUDGEMENT 
OF QUIET TITLE 
Civil No. 223407 and 
C-78-8017 (Consolidated) 
Be it remembered that Plaintiffs' Motion To Set Aside 
Order of Dismissal and Enter Judgement of Quiet Title came for 
hearing before the Honorable David B. Dee, of the above entitled 
court on May 2, 1986, at the hour of ten o'clock a.m. 
Plaintiff was present by and through its counsel of 
record, Mr. Lester A. Perry, of Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell. 
Defendant, Betty Purcell, aka Betty Purcell Martsch, was not 
present, either in person or through counsel; said defendant 
having been previously served with Plaintiffs' Motion and the 
associated pleadings by personal service on April 1, 1986. 
\ \ ^ 
n. McConki* 
Bu»hn*lt 
ssionai Corporation 
S 300 EAST 
i tAKi c m 
TAM 84111 
The court being fully advised in the premises and having 
considered the Motion of plaintiff hereby orders, adjudges and 
decrees: 
1. The Order of Dismissal against defendant Betty 
Purcell, aka Betty Purcell Martsch, signed and entered May 5, 
1980 by the Honorable Earnest F. Baldwin Jr., is hereby set 
aside. 
2. Judgement is hereby entered against Betty 
Purcell, aka Betty Purcell Martsch, quieting Title of all right, 
title and interest of said defendant within the following 
identified real property in and to the plaintiffs1, William D. 
Blodgett and Florence G. Blodgett. The real property to which 
this quiet title judgement applies is located within Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, and is more particularly identified as: 
Beginning at a point in the center of Highland Drive 
on the projected North line of Vine Street (6100 South), 
said point being North 668.9 feet, more or less, and 
West 215.3 feet, more or less, from the Southeast 
corner of Section 16, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence North 
0°20f50M East along center line of Highland Drive 154.0 
feet; thence south 89°15l45" West 197.17 feet; thence South 
0°17I45M West 154.0 feet to North line of Vine Street 
(6100 South); thence North 89°15l45" East along said North 
line 197.03 feet to the point of beginnning. 
Excluding from said above-described property that certain 
property taken by Salt Lake County as a part of the 
Cottonwood Expressway, Project S-0160-1, and more part-
icularly described as follows: Beginning at the 
intersections of grantors West property line and centerline 
of survey at Engineer's Station 176+92.29, which point is 
North 668.90 feet and West 484.09 feet from the Southeast 
corner of said Section 16? and tangency to the curve of said 
-2- n.^O, QQSA*~-
Engineer's Station 176+92.29 bearing South 38°54,40M East; 
thence North 116.0 feet to a point on a 2367.0 foot radius 
curve to the right; thence Southeasterly along the arc of 
said curve a distance of 150.20 feet, more or less, to the 
North line of 6100 South Street; thence West along the North 
line of 6100 South Street 95.41 feet, more or less, to 
grantors West boundary line, the place of beginning, less 
Tract deeded to Salt Lake County and Street. 
Dated this / 7 day o f May> 1986« 
BY THE COURT: 
d B. Dee, p i s t r i f t Judge 
&y-f 
Drtnuty Clerk 
tfcConkie 
«hn«ll 
na! Corporation | 
JOO EAST 
(kKE CITY 
I 84111 
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Lester A. Perry - A2571 
Robert M. Dyer - A0495 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3680 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
, McConkle 
Buahnel! 
svonal Corporation 
5 300 EAST 
LAKE OTY 
AM 84111 
WILLIAM D. BLODGETT and 
FLORENCE G. BLODGETT, his wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOE MARTSCH, BETTY PURCELL, 
a*a BETTY PURCELL MARTSCH, 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
OF QUIET TITLE 
Civil No. 223407l/and 
C-78-8Q17 (Consolidated) 
Be it remembered that Plaintiffs1 Motion To Set Aside Order 
of Dismissal and Enter Judgment of Quiet Title came for hearing 
before the Honorable David B. Dee, of the above entitled court on 
May 2, 1986, at the hour of ten o'clock a.m. 
Plaintiff was present by and through it's counsel of 
record, Mr. Lester A. Perry, of Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell. Defen-
dant, Betty Purcell, aka Betty Purcell Martsch, was not present, 
either in person or through counsel; said defendant having been 
previously served with Plaintiffs' Motion and the associated 
pleadings by personal service on April 1, 1986. 
McConkie 
jfthnftl! 
>nal Corporation 
300 I AST 
AKt CU> 
•i 64111 
The court being fully advised in the premises and having 
considered the Motion of plaintiff hereby orders, adjudges and 
decrees: 
1. The Order of Dismissal against defendant Betty Purcell, 
aka Betty Purcell Martsch, signed and entered May 5, 1980 by the 
Honorable Earnest F. Baldwin Jr., is hereby set aside. 
2. Judgment is hereby entered against Betty Purcell, aka 
Betty Purcell Martsch, quieting Title of all right, title and 
interest of said defendant within the following identified real 
property in and to the plaintiffs', William D. Blodgett and Florence 
G. Blodgett. The real property to which this quiet title judgement 
applies is located within Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and is 
more particularly identified as: 
Beginning at a point in the center of Highland Drive 
on the projected North line of Vine Street (6100 South), 
said point being North 668.9 feet, more or less, and 
West 215.3 feet, more or less, from the Southeast 
corner of Section 16, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence North 
0°20'50" East along center line of Highland Drive 154.0 
feet; thence south 89015,45w West 197.17 feet; thence South 
0°17'45" West 154.0 feet to North line of Vine Street 
(6100 South); thence North 89°15'45" East along said North 
line 197.03 feet to the point of beginnning. 
Excluding from said above-described property that certain 
property taken by Salt Lake County as a part of the 
Cottonwood Expressway, Project S-0160-1, and more part-
icularly described as follows: Beginning at the 
intersections of grantors West property line and centerline 
of survey at Engineer's Station 176+92.29, which point is 
North 668.90 feet and West 484.09 feet from the Southeast 
corner o£ said Section 16; and tangency to the curve of said 
Engineer's Station 176+92.29 bearing South 38o54'40M East; 
thence North 116.0 feet to a point on a 2367.0 foot radius 
-2-
001 ur-k 
curve to the right; thence Southeasterly along the arc of 
said curve a distance of 150.20 feet, more or less, to the 
North line of 6100 South Street; thence West along the North 
line of 6100 South Street 95.41 feet, more or less, to 
grantors West boundary line, the place of beginning, less 
Tract deeded to Salt Lake County and Street. 
3. This Order shall relate back to and be effective as of 
May 5, 1980. 
4. The Complaint of plaintiffs against defendants Betty 
Purcell Martsch, Raco Car Wash Systems, Inc., and Water Park Corpor-
ation is hereby dismissed with prejudice and any and all counter-
claims of said defendants are hereby dismissed with prejudice with 
the parties to bear their own costs. 
5. The sum of $2,450 on deposit with the court in this 
case be paid over to plaintiffs by the clerk of the court. 
Dated this / *> day of August, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
». Dee, net Judge 
ATTES 
H. DIXON. 
*y ^ - / ^ . 
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Lester A. Perry - A2571 
Robert M. Dyer - A0495 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3680 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM D. BLODGETT and 
FLORENCE G. BLODGETT, his wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOE MARTSCH, BETTY PURCELL, 
aka RF.TTY PURCELL MARTSCH, 
Defendants. 
Be it remembered that Plaintiffs' Motion To Set Aside 
Order of Dismissal and Enter Judgment of Quiet Title came for 
hearing before the Honorable David B. Dee, of the above entitled 
court on May 2, 1986, at the hour of ten o'clock a.m. 
Plaintiff was present by and through it's counsel of 
record, Mr. Lester A. Perry, of Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell. 
Defendant, Betty Purcell, aka Betty Purcell Martsch, was not 
present, either in person or through counsel; said defendant 
having been previously served with Plaintiffs' Motion and the 
associated pleadings by personal service on April 1, 1986. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
OF QUIET TITLE 
Civil No. 223407 and 
C-78-8017 (Consolidated) 
0010^ 
I 
n, McConkie 
Bushnell 
S 300 EAST 
T LAKE CITY 
I AH H 4 1 U 
The court being fully advised in the premises and 
having considered the Motion of plaintiff hereby orders, adjudges 
and decrees: 
1. The Order of Dismissal against defendant Betty 
Purcell, aka Betty Purcell Martsch, signed and entered May 5, 
1980 by the Honorable Earnest F. Baldwin Jr., is hereby set 
aside. 
2. Judgment is hereby entered against Betty Purcell, 
aka Betty Purcell Martsch, quieting Title of all right, title and 
interest of said defendant within the following identified real 
property in and to the plaintiffs1, William D. Blodgett and 
Florence G. Blodgett. The real property to which this quiet 
title judgement applies is located within Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, and is more particularly identified as: 
Beginning at a point in the center of Highland 
Drive on the projected North line of Vine Street 
(6100 South), said point being North 668.9 feet, 
more or less, and West 215.3 feet, more or less, 
from the Southeast corner of Section 16, Township 
2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian, and running thence North 0°20,50,t East 
along center line of Highland Drive 154.0 feet; 
thence south 89°15!45" West 197.17 feet; thence 
South 0°17 45" West 154.0 feet to North line of 
Vine Street (6100 South); thence North 89°15,45H 
East along said North line 197.03 feet to the 
point of beginnning. 
Excluding from said above-described property that 
certain property taken by Salt Lake County as a 
part of the Cottonwood Expressway, Project S-0160-1, 
-2-
OOIGC: 
and more particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at the intersections of grantors West 
property line and centerline of survey at 
Engineer's Station 176+92.29, which point is North 
668.90 feet and West 484.09 feet from the 
Southeast corner of said Section 16; and tangency 
to the curve of said Engineer's Station 376+92.29 
bearing South 38°54'40" East; thence North 116.0 
feet to a point on a 2367.0 foot radius curve to 
the right; thence Southeasterly along the arc of 
said curve a distance of 150.20 feet, more or 
less, to the North line of 6100 South Street; 
thence West along the North line of 6100 South 
Street 95.41 feet, more or less, to grantors West 
boundary line, the place of beginning, less Tract 
deeded to Salt Lake County and Street. 
3. This Order shall relate back to and be effective 
of May 5, 1980. 
4. The Complaint of plaintiffs against defendants 
Betty Purcell Martsch, Raco Car Wash Systems, Inc., and Water 
Park Corporation is hereby dismissed with prejudice and any and 
all counterclaims of said defendants are hereby dismissed with 
prejudice with the parties to bear their own costs. 
5. The sum of $2,450 on deposit with the court in th 
case be paid over to plaintiffs by the clerk of the court. 
Dated this *JJo day of September, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
DkVlDB. DEE/ D i s t r i c t Judge 
i McConkie 
Buthnel! 
aonai Co'poratto 
5 300 EAST 
L A K L C I T Y 
AH 841 
H.JOi ON h ^ D L P Y 
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Lester A. Perry - A2571 
Robert M. Dyer - A0495 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
3 30 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3680 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM D. BLODGETT and 
FLORENCE G. BLODGETT, his 
wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOE MARTSCH, BETTY PURCELL, 
aka BETTY PURCELL MARTSCH, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 223407 and 
C-78-8017 (Consolidated) 
The motion of Betty Purcell, aka Betty Purcell Martsch, 
to set aside the amended order of Judge David Dee, dated August 
13, 1986, and the Motion of the plaintiffs, William D. Blodgett 
and Florence G. Blodgett, to set aside the order of Judge David 
Dee extending the time of defendant Purcell to file a notice of 
appeal came for hearing before Judge Dee on November 24, 1986 at 
11:00 a.m. 
i, McConki* 
Buthn*ll 
.yonai Corporation | 
D 300 EAST 
LAKE CilV 
AH 84111 
Defendant Purcell was not present in person but was 
represented by counsel, Mr. James A. Arrowsmith. The plaintiffs, 
the Blodgetts, were not present in person, but were represented 
by counsel, Mr. Lestter A. Petty of Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell. 
The court, having heard the arguments of counsel, and 
being fully advised in the premises, hereby orders that the 
motion of defendant Purcell to set aside the amended order of 
August 13, 1986 is denied, and the motion of the plaintiffs to 
set aside the order extending time to file anotice of appeal is 
denied. 
DATED this ^ /?day of January, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING &4fe._ 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the above an4 
foregoing Order, postage prepaid, to James A. Arrowsmith, 2102 
East 3 3 00 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84109, this f^' day of 
January, 1987. 
) 
t ^ CL ; U v* 
cConkle 
hnell 
J Corporation | 
K) EAST 
<.E CITY 
Mm 
JOI 'JLIC oc 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS 78-51-36 
78-51-34. Change of attorney.—The attorney in any action or special 
proceeding may be changed at any time before judgment or final deter-
mination, as follows: 
(1) Upon his own consent, filed with the clerk or entered upon the 
minutes. 
(2) Upon the order of the court or judge thereof upon the application 
of the client, after notice to the attorney. 
& History: R S. 1898 k C. L. 1907, § 117; 
C. L 1917, §328; R. S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
6-0-33. 
Kotice of withdrawal . 
Where counsel who fil^d answer for 
defendants had attempted to withdraw 
;tom ense before day set for trial , but 
lid not givo notice or have minute entry 
m'ide of his withdrawal, as required by 
this section, court did not err in proceed-
ti\^ ttith trial in absence of defendant•» 
ur their attorne>, since plaintiff's counsel 
and court were justified in relying upon 
notice gn en attorney for defendants until 
such time as he had withdrawn from case 
,i.« provided bv slntute. Staheh v. Adams, 
',6 l \ 276, 190"P. 781. 
Order of substitution. 
Where circumstances leading to appli-
ation foi substitution of at torneys in-
dicate bad faith, collusion, fraud, or 
attempt to cheat attorney of record out 
•it his just claims, court will not make 
order of substitution until such claims 
ore paid. Sandbeig v. Victor Gold 
Silver Min. Co., 18 U. 66, 55 P . 74. 
District court's order grant ing motion, 
made during pend< ncy of action by person 
to whom plaintiff, without knowledge of 
his uncompensated attorneys, had assigned 
his cause of action, for substitution of 
at torneys, held appealable to Supreme 
Court, by supplanted attorneys, as final 
judgment. Sandberg v. Victor Gold & 
Silver Min. Co , ]8 U. 66, 55 P. 74. 
Collateral References. 
Attorney and ClientC=>75(l), 76(1). 
7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client §119 et 
seq. 
7 Am. Jur . 2d 132 et seq., Attorneys at 
Law § 138 et seq. 
Adjustment or determination of com-
pensation of discharged attorney as con-
dition of substitution of attorney by 
court order, 124 A. L. R. 725. 
Withdrawal, discharge, or substitution 
of counsel in criminal case as ground for 
continuance, 73 A. L. R. 3d 725. 
78-51-35. Effect—Notice of change.—When an attorney is changed as 
provided in the next preeeding section [78-51-34], written notice of the 
change and of the substitution of a new attorney or of the appearance of 
the party in person must be gi\en to the adverse party; until then he 
aiu&t recognize the former attorney. 
History: E. 8. 1898 & 0. L. 1907, § 118; 
C L. 1917, §329; K. S. 1933 * C. 1943, 
6-0-34. 
Necessity for notice of change. 
Under this section, an at torney who 
aas appeared for a party may be treated 
as such by opposing counsel until oppos-
ing counsel are notified of dismissal or 
Jiange of attorneys. Notice of appeal 
may be served upon him. Salina Canyon 
Coal Co. v. Klemm, 76 U. 372, 290 P. 161. 
Collateral References. 
Attorney and ClientC=>75(l), 76(1). 
7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 123. 
Construction and effect of s ta tutory 
provision requiring adverse par ty to give 
notice when attorney .ceases to act as 
such, 42 A. L. R. 1347. 
78-51-36. Notice to appoint successor.—When an attorney dies or is 
removed or suspended, or ceases to act as such, a party to an action 
or proceeding for whom he was acting as attorney must before any 
further ^proceedings are had against him be required by the adverse party, 
by written notice, to appoint another attorney or to appear in person. 
575 
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new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrin-
sic or extnnsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party-
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been J^nMy 
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and t h ^ r f S t o i S j 
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has 
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it Is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any ^ ^ 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shaHbe made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), f3>, or (4), not more th^n 3 
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered T t a k e n A 
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the f , n J E ^ a £ £ ^ i or 
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a co i r tTen te r -
tain an independent action to relieve « party from a judgment, orde/or pro-
ceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The pr^edure for 
ob aming any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as J ^ S S ^ ^ 
rules or by an independent action. 
Compiler's Notes. - This rule is patterned Cross-ReferenrP* F~> f„ n 
after, and similar to, Rule 60, F R C P to ^ S ^ t T l S-M * 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Clerical mistakes. 
—Computation of damages. 
—Correction after appeal. 
—Date of judgment 
Void judgment 
—Estate record. 
—Inherent power of courts 
—Intent of court and parties 
—Judicial error distinguished. 
—Order prepared by counsel 
—Predating of new trial motion. 
Other reasons 
—"An} other reason justifying relief." 
Default judgment 
Imposibihty of compliance with order 
Incompetent counsel 
Lack of due process 
Merits of case 
Mistake or inadvertencce 
Real party in interest. 
Requirements 
—Effect of set-aside judgment 
Admissions 
—Fraud 
Divorce action 
—Independent action. 
Constitutionality of taxes 
Divorce decree 
Fraud or duress 
Motion distinguished. 
—Invalid summons. 
189 
Rule 60 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCFIH'RK 
Dev. Corp. 
1980). 
v. Suther, 605 P.2d 1240 (Utah 
Cited in National Farmers Union Property 
& Cas. Co. v. Thompson, 4 Utah 2d 7, 286 P.2d 
249 (1955); Holmes v. Nelson, 7 Utah 2d 435, 
326 P.2d 722 (1958); Howard v. Howard, 11 
Utah 2d 149, 356 P.2d 275 (1960); Nunley v. 
Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc., 15 Utah 2d 126, 
388 P.2d 798 (1964); Hanson v. General Bldrs 
Supply Co., 15 Utah 2d 143, 389 P.2d 61 
(1964); James Mfg. Co. v. Wilson, 15 Utah 2d 
210, 390 P.2d 127 (1964); Porcupine Reservoir 
Co. v. Lloyd W. Keller Corp., 15 Utah 2d 318, 
392 P.2d 620 (1964); Watson v. Anderson. 29 
Utah 2d 36, 504 P.2d 1003 (1973); Nichols v 
Slate, 5f>4 V 2d 231 (Utah 1976>, Edjrar v. 
Wagner, 572 P.2d 405 (Utah 1977); Time Com. 
Fin Corp v. Rrimhall, 575 P.2d 701 (Utah 
1978); Anderton v. Montgomery, 607 P.2d 828 
(Utah 1980>; Miller Pontiac, Inc. v. Osborne. 
622 P.2d 800 (Utah 1981); Mulhenn v. Inger-
soll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1981); 
Kohler v. Garden City, 639 P.2d 162 * Utah 
1981); Pozzolan Portland Cement Co. v Gard-
ner, 668 P.2d 569 (Utah 1983>; Nelson v. 
Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983»; Golden 
Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas. 699 P.2d 730 (Utah 
1985); Estate of Kay, 705 P.2d 1165 (Utah 
1985); York v. Unqualified Washington 
County Elected Officials, 714 P.2d 679 (Utah 
1986). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 58 Am. Jur . 2d New Trial 
§& 11 to 14, 29 et seq., 187 to 191. 
C.J.S. — 66 C.J S. New Trial Sfc 13 et seq , 
115, 116, 122 to 127. 
A.L.R. — Consent as ground of vacating 
judgment, or granting new trial, in civil case, 
after expiration of term or time prescribed by 
statute or rules of court, 3 A.L.R.3d 1191. 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of suggestion 
or comments by judge as to compromise or set-
tlement of civil case, 6 A.L.R.3d 1457. 
Necessity and propriety of counter-affidavits 
in opposition to motion for new trial in civil 
case, 7 A.L.R.3d 1000. 
Quotient verdicts, 8 A.L.R.3d 335. 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of instruc-
tions in civil case as affected by the manner in 
which they are written, 10 A.L.R.3d 501. 
Prejudicial effect of unauthorized view by 
jury in civil case of scene of accident or prem-
ises in question, 11 A.L.R.3d 918. 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of reference 
by counsel in civil case to result of former trial 
of same case, or amount of verdict therein. 15 
AL.R.3d 1101. 
Absence of judge from courtoom during trial 
of civil case, 25 A.L.R.3d 637. 
Juror 's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of 
acquaintance or relationship with attorney in 
case, or with partner or associate of such attor-
ney, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64 
A.L.R.3d 126. 
Amendment, after expiration of time for fil-
ing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion 
made in due time, 69 A.L.R.3d 845. 
Authority of state court to order jury trial in 
civil case where jury has been waived or not 
demanded by parties, 9 A.L.R.4th 1041. 
Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching 
verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on 
appeal, 38 A L.R 4th 1170. 
Jury trial waiver as binding on later state 
civil trial. 48 A.L R 4th 747. 
Key Numbers. — New Trial «=> 13 et seq.. 
110, 116. 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other 
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may 
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of 
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pen-
dency of an appeal, such mistakes may he so corrected before the appeal is 
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending 
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evi-
dence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (l)mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a 
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